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NOTES
DEMISE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL PLAN
Brown v. Board of Education1 outlawed dual racial school systems
but implicitly approved the neighborhood school plan.2 The holding
and subsequent decree3 did not deal with the issue of relief to blacks
within racially imbalanced schools if the imbalance reflects residential
patterns rather than an official policy of separating the races. Some
federal courts and commentators, however, have argued that Brown's
sweeping rationale, which emphasizes the harmful effects of segrega-
tion,4 is broader than its narrow holding; the detrimental effect is
the same whether the segregation is coerced or coincidentalY
Although a plaintiff challenging racial imbalance need not always
prove harm in order to obtain relief," proof of harm does not alone
entitle plaintiff to relief. Courts demand that plaintiff show some
school board involvement in the creation of racial imbalance in order
to satisfy the requirements of state action. The degree of positive,
coercive acts sufficient to demonstrate an overall segregation policy of
the sort condemned in Brown is indeterminate, but many courts have
1 847 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Id. at 495 n.13. President Nixon recently pledged funds that in effect would subsidize
the neighborhood school concept. N.Y. Times, March 25, at 26-27.
3 Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 US. 294 (1955).
4 347 U.S. at 493-95.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 872 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.),
aff'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 889 US. 840 (1967); United
States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, 286 F. Supp. 786, 788-89 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 504-05 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd
sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 1 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC ScHooLs 78-114 (1967) [hereinafter cited as RACIAL
ISOLATION]; Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78
HARv. L. REV. 564, 567-70 (1965). Other authorities suggest that only segregation coerced
by force of law is detrimental to learning. See, e.g., Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd.,
276 F. Supp. 834, 841 (E.D. La. 1967); UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WEL-
FARE, OFFICE OF EDUC., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 807-10 (1966).
6 E.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 869 F.2d 55, 59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
889 U.S. 847 (1967). In light of the "inherently unequal" language in Brown, there may
seem to be no reason for marshaling a vast array of expert testimony to decide the issue
of harm. Where the court is unwilling to grant relief to segregated blacks without a
showing of state action, however, the court may wish to consider segregative harm in
order to equalize tangible educational benefits as much as possible. See, e.g., Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
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held that mere failure to correct racial imbalance is not state action,7
and, therefore, that school boards have no duty to revamp neighbor-
hood school plans to undo bona fide de facto segregation.8 The Supreme
Court has not spoken to the contrary. Consequently, where a rational
neighborhood school plan inadvertently causes racial imbalance, 9 the
narrow holding of Brown is sometimes an insurmountable barrier to
judicial relief.' 0 Blacks in segregated urban ghettos are thus faced with
7 Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964), is the leading case. Accord, Deal v. Cincinnati
Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Webb v.
Board of Educ. of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963). See also Offerman v. Nit-
kowski, 248 F. Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Henry
v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87, 90 (E.D. Mich. 1958); Sealy v. Department of Pub. Instruction,
159 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
8 A definition of "de facto segregation" acceptable to most courts is "the mere
chance or fortuitous concentration of those of a particular race in a particular class or
school-fortuitous 'separation' of the races, not accomplished in any way by the action
of state officials." Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 834, 840 (E.D. La.
1967). By "bona fide" the courts have meant normally valid elements of a neighbor-
hood school plan that would become unconstitutional when coupled with a hidden dis-
criminatory intent. See Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181,
194 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as premature, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), remedy considered
on rehearing, 195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 940 (1961), decree modified, 221 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
No definition of "de facto segregation" is truly satisfactory, since all attempts avoid
the question of what constitutes state action. In its broadest sense, the term "de facto
segregation" stands for an indeterminate racial imbalance that the state may or may
not be required to alleviate, depending on an equally indeterminate level of official
culpability. Once the critical levels of racial imbalance and official culpability are
reached, the segregation becomes de jure. The term "de facto" covers a wide spectrum
of racial imbalance situations but defines a single doctrine of non-accountability. As
such, it causes confusion and dissension among courts while essential policy considera-
tions go unanswered. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 565-66.
9 "Racial imbalance" most frequently refers to a black concentration exceeding
90%. But since schools that are more than 50% black are usually on the way to becoming
all black, it is better "to regard segregation as a process which involves distortions of
the educational system on many levels, including but not limited to varying degrees
of racial imbalance." Peck & Cohen, The Social Context of De Facto School Segregation,
in Dn FAcTo SEGREGATION AND CiVIL RIGIS 186 n.49 (0. Schroeder & D. Smith eds. 1965)
(emphasis in original).
10 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir.
1966) (school board may not create zones to maintain segregation but is not obliged to
redraw boundaries to counteract effects of residential segregation); Webb v. Board of
Educ. of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (irreparable harm as a consequence
of segregation caused by residential patterns does not raise constitutional questions);
Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (school board did not abuse its
discretion in locating schools in segregated neighborhoods when choice was based on
convenience, economy, and safety). Contra, Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Barksdale v.
Springfield Sch. Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 348 F.2d
261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y.
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the anomaly that the Brown integrationist rule is used to justify severe
racial imbalance in public schools.
I
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND THE NEIGHBOR.HOOD SCHOOL PLAN
Recent population statistics demonstrate that residential racial im-
balance is widespread, particularly in metropolitan areas. Black popula-
tion outside the Deep South nearly tripled from 1940 to 1964,11 while
the white population of twenty-four large cities declined seven per-
cent between 1950 and 1960.12 By 1960, nearly two-thirds of blacks
in the North lived in the slums of the twelve largest cities. 13 Recent
studies demonstrate that black and white residential neighborhoods
are rigidly and uniformly separated.14
Superimposing a neighborhood school plan on a pattern of resi-
dential segregation inevitably creates school segregation. 5 In urban
areas the problem is exacerbated by a tendency toward geographically
smaller school zones.16 Even good faith modification of the neighbor-
1964); Branche v. Board of Educ. of Hempstead, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963)
(dictum).
11 C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 30 (1964).
12 Id. at 31.
13 Peck & Cohen, supra note 9, at 175.
14 K. TA~umER & A. TAEUB R, NEGROES IN CrEs 28-68 (1965); Taeuber, Negro
Residential Segregation: Trends and Measurements, 12 SOCIAL PROB. 42, 48 (1964).
15 In elementary schools in 75 cities, 75% of the black students are in schools with
over 90% black enrollment. Conversely, 83% of the white students are in schools with
90% white enrollment. RACIAL ISOLATION 3. A high degree of segregation exists regardless
of the size of the school system (id. at 6), and the pattern does not vary according to the
number of blacks enrolled. See COMM'N ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION, NATIONAL ASs'N OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS OFFICIALS, PUBLIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE
NORTH 21 (1963); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIvIL RIGHTS U.S.A.: PUBLIC
SCHOOLS NORTH AND WEST (1962) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC SCHOOLS NORTH AND WEST];
A. ROSE, DE FACTO SCHOOL SEGREGATION 11 (1964); Peck & Cohen, supra note 9, at 186-87.
The recent growth in school racial imbalances is equally a matter of record. The
following cities have shown an increase: Cincinnati, 5.7% since 1950; Cleveland, 24.9%
since 1952; Detroit, 5.4% since 1960; Milwaukee, 21.% since 1950; New Haven, 14.3%
since 1963; Philadelphia, 8.8% since 1950; Pittsburgh, 19.1% since 1950; San Francisco,
9.5% since 1962. Only one city can boast a decrease in racial imbalance: Buffalo, down
3.5% since 1961. RACIAL ISOLATION 9.
16 Metropolitan areas are served by an average of 30 school districts per city, each
of which draws upon fairly homogeneous racial neighborhoods. RACIAL ISOLATION 17-18.
These compact districts exaggerate residential segregation effects, since they serve more
densely populated areas than the broader suburban school districts, where neighborhoods
may be just as segregated. For example, in the metropolitan North and West in 1965,
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hood school plan to curb racial imbalance is no guarantee of racial
mixing. At the conclusion of a widely praised, eight-year desegregation
program initiated in St. Louis following Brown, nine out of ten black
students attended schools with a black enrollment exceeding ninety
percelnt. 17 In 1963 San Francisco authorities decided to consider racial
factors when drawing attendance zones and choosing school sites, but
a 1965 census indicated that one-quarter of the city's black elementary
school children attended schools whose black enrollment exceeded
ninety percent.' The neighborhood school plan, even if ostensibly
racially indifferent, is clearly incompatible with racial mixing.
II
JUDICIAL ASSAULTS UPON THE STATE ACTION BARRIER
In attacking this problem, the courts have developed several dis-
tinct but compatible approaches. Each of these approaches confronts
the issue of finding sufficient state action to grant relief where the
neighborhood school plan has caused racial imbalance. Exercise of nec-
essary administrative discretion in determining school enrollments, dis-
tribution of overflow, school sites, and school attendance zones may,
of course, have an overpowering impact on the racial balance of the
school system. And improper exercise of this power may create or main-
tain racial imbalance in violation of equal protection. 19
A. Where De Facto Segregation Becomes De Jure by Administrative
Manipulation of the Neighborhood School Plan
The earliest case to condemn a school board's exercise of discretion
followed a vote by New Rochelle, New York, residents to rebuild a
school on its old site in a black neighborhood.20 Plaintiffs demonstrated
44.5% of all black first graders attended schools that were 80-100% black. For non-
metropolitan areas, the corresponding figure was 28.4%. UNrrED STATES BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISmcAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1968, at 122 (89th ed. 1968).
17 R. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 15 (1968).
18 Id. at 88.
19 [I]t is plainly the agents of the State and of its political subdivisions who
select school sites, define attendance areas, and assign Negro children to schools
in which they are racially isolated. .. . [S]chool boards make many discretionary
decisions which affect the degree of racial isolation in the schools.
RACIAL ISOLATION 245. See PUBLC ScHoots NORTH AND WEST, supra note 15, at 7-26.
20 Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed as premature, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), remedy considered on rehearing, 195
F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961), decree
modified, 221 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Plaintiffs were 11 students from Lincoln
School, which was 94% black. New Rochelle had 12 school districts operating under a
1970]
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that: (1) a policy of gerrymandering attendance zones had effectively
segregated New Rochelle's schools since 1930;21 (2) the school board's
campaign for its "old site" proposal in the school building referendum
played upon the "status fears of white homeowners," resulting in a
solid victory for the board;2  (3) the school board had wrongly ignored
the advice of educators, psychologists, sociologists, and state adminis-
trators, who had made lengthy studies of racial imbalance within the
New Rochelle school system.
28
The court held that de jure segregation should include all "segre-
gation created or maintained by official act, regardless of its form. ' '24
Although the court did not explain the extent to which it relied upon
each of its separate findings, the New Rochelle case is most frequently
cited for the narrower proposition that school authorities may not
gerrymander attendance areas to create or perpetuate racial segrega-
tion.25 An independent ground for the court's decision, however, was
the refusal of the school board to act upon the suggestions of educa-
neighborhood school plan with mandatory attendance zones; plaintiffs' requests to attend
an integrated school had been refused. Following the building referendum, plaintiffs
brought suit to gain admission to an integrated school and to enjoin construction of the
new school.
21 191 F. Supp. at 184. The court accepted the school board's testimony that two of
three New Rochelle black elementary school children attended integrated schools. Id.
at 183. Plaintiffs, however, offered uncontradicted evidence that school district lines had
been redrawn when new schools were added nearby, apparently to create predominantly
white schools. Id. at 185.
A free transfer policy for whites was available until 1949, at which time Lincoln
School was completely black. Id. By that time, civic group pressure forced the §chool
board to discontinue its open transfer policy, although the board still refused to redraw
Lincoln's gerrymandered district lines, which were frozen until suit was brought. Id. at
186.
22 Principals throughout the school system wrote letters to parents urging support
for the school board proposal to build the new Lincoln School on its old site and
indicating that integration was the prime referendum issue. Id. at 191. The letters
intimated that if the proposal were defeated, a large number of blacks would be trans-
ferred to outlying "white" schools. Id. The school board also resorted to public advertise-
ment in its campaign and put pressure on PTA members who did not fall in line. Id.
23 Id. at 193. These experts unanimously emphasized the harm done by racial im-
balance in New Rochelle schools, but the school board resolved that "[t]he solution to
the problem of racial, religious or other concentrations of children does not lie with the
schools, but rather with the community and its living patterns." Id. at 190.
24 Id. at 194 n.12 (emphasis added). By necessity, this means that acts of past boards
are equivalent to policies of the present board for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See id. at 183 n.3.
25 E.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 62 (6th Cir. 1966); Bradley v.
School Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. School Dist.
151 of Cook County, 286 F. Supp. 786, 798 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
But see Downs v. Board of Educ. of Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988, 998 (10th Cir. 1964) (the
New Rochelle case recognizes affirmative duty to eliminate de facto segregation).
[Vol. 55:594
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tional experts, who concluded that the school board was able to al-
leviate racial imbalance.2 6 This reasoning is entirely in line with the
court's prohibition of officially maintained segregation, regardless of
its form, and leads to the conclusion that ordinary de facto segregation
may become de jure where a potential for relieving racial imbalance is
untapped.
Recent litigation in Denver27 accentuates the difference between
potential and achievement in relieving racial imbalance created by the
white exodus from urban centers and the movement of black popula-
tions to and within the central cities.28 During the last ten years,
black migration to northeast Denver has steadily increased.29 Following
defeat of a board proposal to build a new junior high school in a
potentially segregated neighborhood, 0 a special study committee on
equality in educational opportunity was appointed to examine racial
and ethnic problems within the school system. The committee accused
the board of education of so fixing attendance zones as to perpetuate
existing de facto segregation and accordingly inferior education.8 1 It
recommended that racial, ethnic, and socio-economic factors be given
consideration in establishing new boundaries and locating new schools.
3 2
26 191 F. Supp. at 188-89, 193.
27 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo.), remanded,
Civil No. 432-69 (10th Cir.), remedy modified, 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo.), vacated, Civil No.
432-69 (10th Cir.), order reinstated, 90 S. Ct. 12 (Brennan, Circuit Justice, 1969).
28 See text at notes 11-14 supra.
29 The Denver black population has traditionally been concentrated within the
"Five Points" community. In the late 1950's blacks began to move into the newer "Park
Hill" community, which became substantially segregated. 303 F. Supp. at 282. According
to the court, "[t]he trend of the population was apparent long before the migration of
the Negro population eastward" to the boundary of Park Hill was completed. Id.
Notwithstanding the inevitable growth of an all-black- community, the school board
built Barrett Elementary School in the late 1950's to serve what later became an over-
whelmingly black area. Id. Conversely, Stedman Elementary School was built to accom-
modate the white community east of Park Hill. Stedman at one time operated 20%
beyond capacity, but the overflow was not transferred to Barrett, only a few blocks away.
Id. at 282, 285. Once Barrett was built, black students attending a formerly integrated
school in the predominantly white sector of Park Hill were transferred to Barrett, thus
ensuring the racial character of both schools. Id. at 282. When the persistent black
migration eastward converted Stedman into a segregated school, the board refused to
relieve the pressures on congested, segregated classrooms by boundary changes. The
changes that were made actually intensified segregation. Id. at 285.
The court concluded upon remand that this history of consciously imposing an
inflexible neighborhood school plan upon segregated neighborhoods in itself made out a
case of de jure segregation. Id. at 295.
80 An important factor in the defeat of this proposal was public protest that this
new school, like Barrett, would soon be segregated. Id. at 283.
81 Id.
82 The board adopted the study committee's findings and recommendations in Policy
1970]
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In early 1969 the board attempted to reverse the trend of intensified
segregation by remapping attendance zones and busing black and white
students, some of them volunteers, into racially imbalanced schools.8
In June 1969, however, after Denver voters had elected two new mem-
bers, the board rescinded the integrationist measures. 4 The court held
this retreat to the status quo an act of de jure segregation and granted
a preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement of the desegregation
plan.
85
Although the Denver court claimed that it was not dealing with
"innocent de facto segregation,"2 6 the traditional concept of that type
of segregation-school racial imbalance reflecting stationary or shifting
residential patterns-did confront the court to a considerable extent.
While the rescission of the integrationist resolutions provided ample
ground for a finding of de jure segregation, the court appeared more
concerned with the overall pattern of racial imbalance. To the extent
that the school board consciously increased that imbalance, its actions
further supported a finding of de jure segregation. But to the extent
that the school board simply ignored the desegregation options avail-
able to it, de facto segregation elements were incorporated into the
court's opinion. The court therefore seemed to imply that plaintiffs
might have been entitled to some remedy similar to that afforded by
the rescinded integrationist resolutions even if they had never been
5100 but failed to take effective action to correct racial and ethnic imbalances. Id.
Existing racial and ethnic homogeneity was increased by subsequent board actions
directly contrary to the committee's policy findings. In 1965, eight rooms were added to a
predominantly black school within a segregated neighborhood. Twenty-eight mobile
units, retained on a more-or-less permanent basis, likewise added to the concentration of
blacks in Park Hill schools. Id. at 285.
33 Id. at 283, 292. At that time, 10,000 students were being bused to relieve over-
crowding; the desegregation plan required the busing of an additional 2,000 students.
Record at 10, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969).
34 The rescission came as a direct response to a voter mandate. 303 F. Supp. at 284.
35 Id. at 288. The board appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the case for a
hearing on the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 US.C. § 2000c-6 (1964), which
prohibits a court from ordering busing as relief in suits brought pursuant to the statute.
Civil No. 432-69. The district court held the provision inapplicable to this suit, which was
not brought pursuant to the statute. 303 F. Supp. at 295. Nonetheless, the court of
appeals vacated the order for a preliminary injunction because (1) all the issues had not
been litigated in the hearing for a preliminary injunction, and (2) community support
for the integration plan would be greater following a trial. - F.2d at -. Sitting as
Circuit Justice, Justice Brennan overruled the court of appeals and reinstated the order
for a preliminary injunction. 90 S. Ct. at 13. Perhaps the busing issue is moot because
some opponents of the plan resorted, to self-help and destroyed or damaged 39 of the
school system's buses, which will cost approximately $200,000 to replace. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1970, at 21, cob. 2.
36 303 F. Supp. at 287.
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enacted. The Denver case, therefore, like the New Rochelle case, may
stand for the broader proposition that complacency in the face of
capacity to change may transform an otherwise legitimate neighbor-
hood school policy into a de jure segregation program.
B. Where De Facto Segregation Cannot be Justified Despite Good
Faith
Another court has adopted an alternative approach to the con-
stitutionality of a school board's failure to accommodate shifting racial
populations. In a recent Washington, D.C., case,3 7 plaintiffs argued per-
suasively that rigid adherence to a 1954 neighborhood school plan had
produced predictably severe racial imbalances in city schools.38 Al-
though the 1954 plan had achieved some immediate integration, 9 the
court agreed that massive white migration to western Washington
neighborhoods and outlying suburbs had foreshadowed an increase in
black ghettoizadon. 40
The court reasoned, however, that mere affirmative satisfaction
with school racial imbalances fell short of the actual intent requisite
to a finding of de jure segregation. But the court went on to consider
the constitutionality of de facto segregation created by non-racial
classifications, 41 demanding a "compelling or adequate justification"
37 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nor. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
38 Id. at 418. In recent years Washington, D.C. whites have flocked to Virginia and
Maryland suburbs, and those still in the city are concentrated in the western quarter.
The segregation is aggravated by private school enrollment. Id. at 410.
39 In the 1954-55 school year, 27% of Washington's schools were either all-black or
all-white. A year later, the figure was 17%. Id. at 411.
40 See id. at 410. The failure of the school board to account for this shift in
population was aggravated by a number of school board policies: students claiming to
be psychologically upset by integration were allowed to transfer to white schools; students
did not have to attend their neighborhood school if already enrolled in an under-
populated school; rigid attendance zones were replaced with optional zones having the
purpose of excusing whites from attending predominantly black schools. In at least one
instance, a zone was created to produce a white concentration within one school. Id. at
415-17. Since most of these policies had been abandoned, the court was free to rule that
the school board presently "believed in the neighborhood school policy and the legitimate
values they saw it as furthering." Id. at 418. Accordingly, the court concluded that there
was a lack of intent to segregate by means of the neighborhood school plan. Id.
41 It is a curious conclusion that de facto segregation could be judged unconstitu-
tional by any standards. The court apparently meant that while there was insufficient
state action to bring the segregation within the purview of Brown, the mere operation
of the school system was enough state action to justify a modified constitutional test.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US. 1, 19 (1958) (dictum) (state action follows from any arrange-
ment, management, funds, or property in public education).
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for neighborhood school policies with a segregative effect.42 The court
thus demanded the same degree of justification as if the classification
were racial. Applying this test, the court found the considerations of
ease and cost of transportation outweighed by the educational value
of integration4 and ordered, inter alia, busing of black volunteers from
overcrowded black schools to under-enrolled white schools. 44
C. Where Implementing the "Equal Educational Opportunity" Prin-
ciple Restricts Balancing
A court using a "compelling justification" approach to racial im-
balance in public schools assumes the imbalance is caused by a ques-
tionable non-racial classification and balances the detriment of racial
separation against the difficulty of overcoming or reducing that racial
separation. 45 Other courts have ignored the classification formula and
instead have considered only Brown's equal educational opportunity
rationale.46 They find the requisite state action in the mere operation
of a tax-supported, compulsory-attendance school system.47 Although
these courts recognize the fallacy of attempting to abolish all de facto
42 269 F. Supp. at 508. The justification must be strong, since (1) the classification
is imposed on a disadvantaged minority, (2) a critical personal right is involved, (3) legis-
lative and administrative relief is either unavailable or ineffective, and (4) the right to
an integrated education is the very assistance that handicapped minorities need to over-
come racial discrimination. Id. at 506-08. For an evaluation of this test, see Note, Hobson
v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HAsv. L. R-v. 1511
(1968).
43 269 F. Supp. at 504-08.
44 Id. at 517. A busing plan was an obvious option open to the school board. Eleven
under-enrolled, predominantly white schools could have been filled by more than 1,100
blacks from overcrowded schools. Id. at 509 n.200.
The court further ordered the school board to formulate its own desegregation plan
and to consider, inter alia, the possibility of educational parks, metropolitan cooperative
school districts with outlying suburbs, additional busing, and rezoning. Id. at 510-11.
45 The non-racial classification formula adopted by the Hobson court is nothing
more than a judicial gloss that camouflages the court's assertion of the equal educational
opportunity principle, thus depriving the "compelling justification" test of wholly in-
dependent significance. See Note, supra note 42, at 1513; Note, Constitutional Law-De
Facto Segregation-The Courts and Urban Education, 46 N.C.L. R-v. 89, 92-94 (1967);
Note, Hobson v. Hansen: The De Facto Limits on Judicial Power, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1249
(1968).
46 In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
47 Barksdale v. Springfield Sch. Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated on other
grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, 226 F. Supp.
208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ. of Hempstead, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y.
1962).
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segregation, 8 they defend a limited application of the equal educational
opportunity test on two grounds: (1) the Supreme Court mandated
lower courts to interdict evasive schemes of segregation whether ac-
complished "ingeniously or ingenuously,"49 and (2) those who are
trapped within racially imbalanced schools are powerless to overcome
their segregation. In applying this test, courts apparently balance to
a lesser extent than under a "compelling justification" test.50
48 In leaving open the question. whether a duty exists to alleviate de facto segrega-
tion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
[D]e facto segregation resulting from residential patterns in a non-racially mo-
tivated neighborhood school system has problems peculiar to such a system. The
school system is already a unitary one. The difficulties lie ...in determining
how far school officials must go and how far they may go in correcting racial
imbalance . . . A broad-brush doctrinaire approach, therefore, that Brown's
abolition of the dual school system solves all problems is conceptually and
pragmatically inadequate for dealing with de facto-segregated neighborhood
schools.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 280 F.2d 385, 389 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
Factors in creating residential segregation that should be influential in defining the
limits of the equal educational opportunity test include: economic disability, anticipation
of a hostile reception in a white neighborhood, and the invasion-succession sequence that
rapidly turns integrated neighborhoods into ghettos. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 585.
49 Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, 226 F. Supp. 208, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), citing
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
GO See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.), reporting that a Los Angeles
Superior Court ordered the city's school system to be integrated by September 1971 even
though this would require busing 240,000 of the system's 674,000 students, cost $40 million
the first year and $20 million each year thereafter,, and increase the $34 million-$54
million deficit already confronting the school system. See also Blocker v. Board of
Educ. of Manhasset, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ.
of Hempstead, 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). Blocker involved a district with
three elementary schools with mandatory attendance zones. Black population in a
zone that had been fixed since 1929 had risen to 90% by 1950. In 1962 the elemen-
tary school was 94% black. 226 F. Supp. at 210-11. Although the school board thought
integration would be "highly desirable" and somewhat attainable, nothing was done to
relieve racial imbalance. Id. at 215. The court ordered the board to formulate a
desegregation plan but offered no concrete guidelines. Id. at 230. The Branche court
established a strictly worded test in ruling that failure to deal with de facto segregation
inflicted harm equal to that suffered under de jure conditions: "The effort to mitigate
the consequent educational inadequacy has not been made and to forego that effort...
is to impose [educational inadequacy] in the absence of a conclusive demonstration that no
circumstantially possible effort can effect any significant mitigation." 204 F. Supp. at 153. A
year later, another court spoke of a duty to relieve racial imbalance "insofar as reasonably
feasible" regardless of cause. Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881-82, 382
P.2d 878, 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 610 (1963) (dictum). In Barksdale v. Springfield 5h. Comm.,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 248 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965), the
court's order was an exact restatement of a school board resolution enacted just before
suit was brought and discontinued pending outcome of the case (id. at 544): "to eliminate
to the fullest extent possible, racial concentration . . . within the framework of effective
educational procedures." Id. at 547. Perhaps the court believed that only judicial super-
vision would spur the board to its best efforts. Aside from financial difficulties, such a
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D. Where Superimposition of a Neighborhood School Plan Upon a
Pattern of Private Housing Discrimination Breeds Segregation
The New Rochelle, Washington, and Denver cases demonstrate
that a neighborhood school plan may be unconstitutional if it creates
or maintains racial imbalance. An intent to discriminate, actual or
inferred, is requisite to a finding of de jure segregation; if the segre-
gation is de facto notwithstanding intent, intent will aid a court ap-
plying a "compelling justification" balancing test in determining a
school board's options. For those courts following an "equal educational
opportunity" rule, intent is immaterial, since the focus is on the quality
of education, apart from the actions of the school board.
An independent argument against the constitutionality of racially
imbalanced schools is the "superimposition" theory,51 which disregards
rule might well be self-defeating: when substantial integration begins, whites may flee
to the suburbs. See Alsop, No More Nonsense About Ghetto Education, THE Naw
REPumuc, July 22, 1967, at 18. Some commentators have expressed doubts as to the
feasibility of courts as institutions of change in this area. See Kurland, Equal Educational
Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CH. L. REV.
583 (1968); Note, supra note 42, at 1525-27. Contra, Wright, Public School Desegregation:
Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285, 306-07 (1968).
51 See Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968), where the court,
in trying to determine the segregative potential of a proposed school site, ordered the
lower court upon remand to determine, inter alia, whether residential segregation
resulted from private discrimination in the housing market:
If residential racial discrimination exists, it is immaterial that it results from
private action. The school board cannot build its exclusionary attendance areas
upon private racial discrimination. Assignment of pupils to neighborhood schools
is a sound concept, but it cannot be approved if residence in a neighborhood is
denied to Negro pupils solely on the ground of color.
Id. at 41-42 (footnotes omitted). The majority in Brewer was not concerned with the
enormity of such an ambitious project, which the dissent said would require the lower
court to canvass blacks to determine if they preferred or had the financial capacity to
live elsewhere, why they settled where they did, and whether the residence was acquired
by purchase or by some other way not amenable to discrimination. Id. at 44. Another
court held that if the school board elects to desegregate by redrawing attendance zones,
it must draw district lines to counteract the effect of residential segregation. United
States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D.N.C. 1968). Two other
federal courts have taken judicial notice of the feedback relationship between school
and residential segregation in applying the equal educational opportunity rule. In
Barksdale v. Springfield Sch. Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated on other
grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965), the court said:
It is neither just nor sensible to proscribe segregation having its basis in
affirmative state action while at the same time failing to provide a remedy for
segregation which grows out of discrimination in housing, or other economic
or social factors.
Id. at 546. In Blocker v. Board of Educ. of Manhasset, 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964),
the court held that to argue that blacks preferred segregated neighborhoods over in-
tegrated ones was "to ignore the actualities," since most white families in the area were
well-to-do. Id. at 212. Accord, United States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, 286 F.
Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.) (dictum), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968). Contra, Downs v.
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS
segregative intent as well as student educational rights. Admittedly,
these rights are the moving consideration, but the theory itself rests
on the idea that the school board adopts the discriminating posture
of homeowners and the private housing industry by arranging neighbor-
hood school attendance districts congruent to racial neighborhoods.
This theory is not incompatible with other de jure or de facto segre-
gation theories that regard intent as a material element of a violation,
since "[g]hettoization is a known fact, a part of the social reality that
the school board must consider when it makes decisions." 5
2
The superimposition theory rests upon the formidable pressures
hindering residential integration and the repeated decisions of whites
to seek segregated schools. Past and present residential discrimination
against blacks by private5" and public5 4 sectors has foreclosed neighbor-
hood integration as a realistic possibility for many blacks. Even where
white sentiment against integration is initially weak, anticipated racial
prejudice and blacks' economic disadvantages militate against residen-
tial integration. Moreover, private discrimination partly determines
both racial composition of public schools and choice of neighborhood.
The white parent who wishes his children to attend a white school
gains assurance from rigidly administered neighborhood school plans
that black and white schools, even in the same locale, will retain their
racial identity.55
Board of Educ. df Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914
(1965); Broussard v. Houston Independent Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1966),
aff'd, 395 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally Fiss, supra note 5, at 585-88.
52 Fiss, supra note 5, at 585.
53 Discriminatory practices of builders, financers, and real estate brokers contribute
to the discrimination practiced by homeowners. See RACIAL ISOLATION 20. Although racial
covenants are no longer enforceable, the lingering effects of past enforcement still may
be considerable because neighborhoods develop fixed residential patterns that become
self-reinforcing. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 586. And although unenforceable, racial cov-
enants are still being made in Washington, D.C. UNrrED SrATES COMM'N ON CRvii. RIGHTs,
CIvIL RIGHTS U.S.A.: HOUsING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 33 (1962).
54 There are still unrepealed ordinances requiring segregation that, though constitu-
tiolnally unenforceable on their face, have a coercive effect upon private choice, especially
where they reflect local sentiment. Fiss, supra note 5, at 586. See Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (courts must
realistically estimate the effect of legislation in encouraging private discrimination);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). In addition, traditional police powers of
eminent domain, zoning, and building regulation have been used to discourage private
builders from building for minority groups, as well as to dissuade blacks from moving
into suburbs. See Wiley v. Richland Water Dist. (D. Ore. 1960), reprinted in 5 RACE REL.
L. REP. 788 (1960); Hearings Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights in Cleveland,
Ohio 205-11, 726-29 (1966).
55 Fiss, supra note 5, at 587-88. This theory is supported to some extent by findings
of racial segregation in Chicago. There, researchers reported:
[A]t the critical point-whatever it is-a formerly stable state of integration
tends to deteriorate, being reflected by the exodus of white pupils. At the same
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On its face, the superimposition theory is hostile to even the
restricted balancing of a "compelling justification" test, since the
interests of white homeowners and the housing industry in racial
discrimination merit no constitutional protection. But courts and
school boards are handicapped by the practical impossibility of lay-
ing out a workable system of attendance zones to counteract every
act of private discrimination.56
III
THE VIABLE ALTERNATIvES TEST IN DE FACTO SEGREGATION CASES
Whichever theory is used, there is clearly a trend away from the
earlier rule57 that local school boards are not obliged to remedy segre-
gation outside the pale of older de jure standards. By rejecting this
narrow state action doctrine, courts have attempted to define the full
extent of an affirmative duty to desegregate imbalanced schools,5
time that this process is going on in the schools, the exodus of white residents
is also apparent in the turnover of housing to the Negroes at only a slightly
slower pace.
PUBLIC SCHOoLs NoRTH AND WSt, supra note 15, at 185-86.
56 Half the problem is discovering the extent of private discrimination and then
deciding what quantum of discrimination justifies relief. See Brewer v. School Ed.
of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 44 (4th Cir. 1968) (dissent). The other half is weaving
attendance zones in and out of black and white communities in conformity with judicial
findings on discrimination while still maintaining compact school districts.
57 See cases cited in note 7 supra. These decisions have often been confused with
another line of cases stemming from the famous dictum in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp.
776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955), that the Constitution "does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination." Briggs and most of the subsequent cases that relied upon it oc-
curred within the context of formerly de jure segregated school districts. Under these
circumstances, courts at first held that school boards fulfilled their constitutional duty
by ceasing segregative policies. Recent cases, however, have expressly repudiated the
Briggs doctrine and have announced an affirmative duty to integrate formerly de jure
segregated schools. Green v. Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
This distinction between de facto segregated school systems and those having a past
record of de jure segregation leads to an incongruous double standard. The latter are
required to achieve some actual degree of integration while the former are not. This has
already become a problem in deciding to what extent a school district must purge itself
of former de jure policies before it can assert the same arguments of cost and inconvenience
pleaded by de facto segregated school districts. See, e.g., Downs v. Board of Educ. of
Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 800 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
58 In ruling against sophisticated techniques of continuing segregation in school
districts once operated as dual racial systems, the courts have adopted a broader concept
of state action. See Green v. Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), where the Supreme
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regardless of the cause of the imbalance. Whether a court claims that
it has determined (1) that school officials consciously if not conscien-
tiously followed an otherwise legitimate neighborhood school plan that
increased racial imbalance, (2) that the imbalance requires compelling
justification, (3) that the imbalance cannot withstand an equal educa-
tional opportunity test, or (4) that the imbalance represents a reinforce-
ment of private residential discrimination, the court is in actuality
requiring the school board to prove that the educational value of
existing policies substantially outweighs the integrative value of policies
it rejected. Delinquency in achieving racial balance may be unconstitu-
tional if viable alternatives were open to the school board that would
have decreased or at least not exacerbated racial imblance. 59 Default
Court held that failure to provide the most effective means of integration possible was
unlawful state action. By analogy, some courts have similarly expanded the state action
concept in de facto segregation cases in ruling unlawful certain abuses of the neighbor-
hood school plan that have the effect of forestalling or preventing integration.
59 What constitutes a "viable alternative" poses a thorny problem with this solu-
tion. Assuming that a court did find that integrationist options were open, there are
no criteria for the school board or the court to determine who has the right to be in-
tegrated.
The mere impossibility of defining such a "right" in terms applicable to individ-
uals, or even classes of individuals, other than on a purely fortuitous and dr-
cufnstantial basis, is itself a strong mitigating factor against attempting to
postulate that right.
Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 834, 846 (ED. La. 1967). Difficulty
in fashioning a workable rule, however, is never an excuse for ignoring a constitutional
right, especially where a critical personal right is concerned. See Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964), where the Court extended the one-man, one-vote doctrine to con-
gressional districts, despite the practical difficulties suggested by the dissent. Id. at 21.
In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the one-man, one-vote rule was held
applicable to local units of general governmental powers despite similar objections made
by the dissent. Id. at 489-90; cf. Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
To answer the threshold question of what alternatives were and remain open to
the school board, a court might inquire into the following: past governmental policy
of segregation (e.g., gerrymandered attendance zones, open transfer system for whites,
enforced residential segregation, failure to take existing or predictable racial imbalance
into consideration in site selections or additions to old schools) and the financial capacity
of the school board to integrate racially imbalanced schools by such measures as busing,
rezoning, closing segregated schools, or planning districts according to modern integra-
tionist schemes (e.g., feeder systems, the Princeton Plan, educational parks). For a dis-
cussion of these schemes, see RACIAL ISOLATION 115-84; Levenson, Educational Implications
of De Facto Segregation, 16 CASE W. REs. L. Ray. 545 (1965). In deciding what relief to
grant, the court must consider the practical benefits afforded by the neighborhood school
plan, namely, convenience, dollar savings, accessibility, safety, and utilization of school
space. Arguments of "community interest" have been less well received. See, eg., Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
School board records, policy recommendations by public officials and private authorities
on integration, statistical data, and expert testimony seem to have been reasonably con-
clusive in cases to date. Since the school board draws up a revised neighborhood school
plan upon the court's order, this question is not foreclosed even after the court holds
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in achieving racial balance can be translated into state action by
focusing on the policies a school board pursued as opposed to the effec-
tive desegregation measures it might have taken. And a state's default
that approves or encourages racial inequality denies equal protection. 60
One version of the viable alternatives test has been criticized as
asking school authorities to prove that they have ceased earlier de jure
discriminatory policies. 61 If the contention is that an intent to segre-
gate is being inferred from a capacity to relieve segregation coupled
with a failure to do so, it is accurate. The inference explains the refer-
ences in de facto segregation cases to "affirmative action" in creating
racially imbalanced schools and to "affirmative satisfaction" in keeping
them imbalanced. The criticism attacks the test as unwarrantedly
cynical toward school officials, but the test goes no further than enabling
plaintiffs to overcome a difficult burden of proof of segregative intent.62
for plaintiffs. Fears that a court might inadvertently order a school board to accomplish
the impossible or at least the improvident are therefore unwarranted. Furthermore,
many remedies for racial imbalance available today have not been explored by school
authorities, and there is little incentive to do so without judicial pressure. See generally
RAciAL ISOLATION 115-83.
60 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court held
that where the state leases a restaurant on public property it is in a position to forbid pri-
vate discrimination, and failure to exercise that power violates equal protection. The
Court emphasized that neither passivity nor innocence excuses the state from its affirma-
tive duty to avoid vicarious discrimination. "[N]o State may effectively abdicate its
responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever
the motive may be." Id. at 725; cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1 (1948). The case
against default in decision-making should be even stronger where public institutions are
involved. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
61 Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 834, 846 (E.D. La. 1967). There
is support for this interpretation in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969):
Once nearly complete student segregation is shown in a school system in which
de jure segregation had formerly been the rule, when challenged the burden
falls on the school board to show that the observed segregation stems from the
application of racially neutral policies.
Id. at 417. The court further argued that it was empowered to insist on an actual degree
of integration after de jure segregation had allegedly ended, since the court as well as
the community is entitled to concrete assurance that official segregation no longer exists.
Id. at 494-95.
62 See Bryant v. Board of Educ. of Mt. Vernon, 274 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
where the court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs, who alleged de jure
segregation in a neighborhood school plan that established attendance zones on both
sides of railroad tracks bisecting the town. Eighty percent of the town's black population
lived on one side of the tracks. Conceding that serious problems of racial imbalance did
exist, the court nonetheless ruled that no remedy was warranted, because the imbalance
"could only have come about by reason of the movement of Negro population into the
affected zones, the movement out of white population and the removal of many of the
remaining white children to private and parochial schools.' Id. at 277 (footnote omitted).
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Plaintiff need only allege a history of official acts with a segregative
effect to make out a prima facie case of purposeful, unlawful segrega-
tion.63
The burden of proof should then be cast on the school board to
demonstrate that it did not refuse to implement integrationist options
open to it.64 If the school board has the capacity, within the framework
of effective educational procedures, to relieve racial imbalance but does
not, then it violates the equal educational opportunity principles of
Brown and is under a duty to alleviate that imbalance. Seen in this
light, unreasonable racial imbalance and capacity to relieve are con-
stitutional mirror images.65 The duty to ease racial imbalance in public
schools and the appropriate relief a court might order66 are insepara-
ble.67
Acts normally lawful become unlawful when coupled with a segregative intent.
Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dis-
missed as premature, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), remedy considered on rehearing, 195 F. Supp.
231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 940 (1961), decree mod-
ified, 221 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87, 91 (E.D. Mich.
1958). Intent in educational planning, as in tort law, might be inferred from the sub-
stantial certainty that an act will result in harm. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ToRTS § 8 (8d ed. 1964). Proof that a school board had actual knowledge of prior
alternatives might be helpful in estimating present capacity to elect those choices, but
actual intent to segregate should not be a separate requisite to liability.
63 See Comment, De Facto Segregation-The Elusive Spectre of Brown, 9 Vxu.. L.
Rav. 283, 286-87 (1964); Comment, De Facto Segregation and the Neighborhood School,
9 WAYNE L. Rav. 514, 521 (1963); Note, De Facto Segregation-A Study in State Action,
57 Nw. U.L. REv. 722, 785-36 (1963).
64 At this juncture expert testimony is essential. See note 59 supra. While there is
no escape from an ad hoc determination of justifiability, relatively even standards seem
available with the assistance of state commissions on education and national professional
groups.
65 When a neighborhood school plan creates racial imbalance, it should be judged
as a state practice that adversely affects a racial group. In this way, the equal educa-
tional opportunity rule is fused with the principle that even a "legitimate and sub-
stantial" governmental purpose "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
66 The resolution of this problem [constitutionality of de facto segregation] does
not settle the proper limits of any remedial obligation that may be imposed, al-
though the range of correctional measures practically available to the school
board is a relevant consideration in deciding whether a violation exists.
Fiss, supra note 5, at 598.
67 Although courts normally require school boards to submit their own plans for
desegregation, the courts can exercise broad discretion in eliminating such vestiges of dis-
crimination as gerrymandered district lines and optional transfer zones. See United
States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d
1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.' 1969). The court can require a school board
to take racial factors into consideration when formulating plans for faculty and pupil
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This approach recognizes the need for a solution to segregation
problems in the face of increasingly subtle techniques of discrimina-
tion68 and the ghettoization of urban America. So long as a substantial
portion of the white community remains hostile to school integration,
no rule can guarantee actual racial mixing; white parents would still
have the option of sending their children to private schools or moving
to an all-white community. As a first step in challenging evasions of
school integration, however, courts have shaken off their earlier knee-
jerk response to "de facto" segregation and have realized that school
boards cannot evade their educational responsibility by a talismanic
escape clause.
R. M. Rader
assignment, the location and construction of schools, school transportation, and the educa-
tional structure of the community. United States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County,
supra. A court can order reinstatement of a rescinded school program to promote in-
tegration. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo.), remanded,
Civil No. 432-69 (10th Cir.), remedy modified, 303 F. Supp. 284 (D. Colo.), vacated, Civil No.
432-69 (10th Cir.), order reinstated, 90 S. Ct. 12 (Brennan, Circuit Justice, 1969). Busing can
be ordered to ease overcrowding in racially imbalanced schools, unless school officials
can come forward with a more efficient means of integrating a substantial number of
students. See United States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, supra. On appeal the dis-
senters in the Cook County case thought that the majority improperly ignored the "no
busing" provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1964), which authorizes
the Attorney General to bring suit where aggrieved parties are financially unable to liti-
gate. 404 F.2d at 1136. The majority held that the prohibition upon busing remedies
applied only to relief granted for de facto segregation. Given either interpretation,
especially that of the dissent, the provision puts an artificial restriction on federal courts
in mapping out reasonable changes of a neighborhood school plan. But see Proposed
Amendment No. 463 to H.R. 514, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This rider to an HEW
appropriations bill would make it the "policy" of the federal government (and thus
subject to discretionary enforcement) to apply HEW desegregation guidelines to all
segregated school systems without regard to the "origin or cause" of the segregation. Its
southern sponsors apparently hope that northerners will find massive integration so
unpalatable that the South will be given a reprieve from full-scale integration.
Generally, the cases reveal two problems in granting appropriate relief. There is
the technical difficulty of maintaining jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the court's
orders are carried out in the time and manner specified. Also, the extent of judicial power
to relieve racial imbalance is unclear, since Brown and Brown 1I ordered only the dis-
mantling of traditional de jure segregation, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c-6 (1964), contains an explicit limitation on judicial power. Therefore, it is more
practical to encourage the school board to choose the most effective means of integration
than to place the initiative upon the court.
68 For a discussion of the unworkability of the "freedom of choice" plan and its
use as a subterfuge for segregation, see Green v. Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
("freedom of choice" plan that does not achieve actual integration in formerly de jure
segregated schools is unconstitutional); UNImT STATES COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, SURVEY
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND BORDEI STATES, 1965-66, at 33-42 (1966);
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 111 (1968).
